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Platform Labour and Contingent 
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ABSTRACT: The impact of digital platforms upon the employment structure and work conditions has attracted widespread scholarly 
attention. However, research on workers’ agency and subjectivity in the platform economy is relatively under-explored. Using food-
delivery workers in China as a point of departure, this article provides an empirically grounded and theoretically informed account of 
delivery workers’ agentic performances. We utilise the notion of contingent agency to capture the expedient, ongoing, and variegated 
measures developed and manoeuvred by workers to exercise agency from their structurally vulnerable position in the labour process 
and employment relations. While agency in practice is always contingent and never static, we conceptualise the notion by unpacking 
the multiple factors that have shifted the ground for workers and hence contributed to the contingency, to shed light on the interplay 
between workers’ agency and the unstable and elusive character of platform capitalism. The article concludes with a discussion on the 
implications of workers’ contingent agency for labour politics.
KEYWORDS: Platform labour, food-delivery platform, worker agency, China.
Introduction
The question of how digital technologies have changed the employment 
structure in China leads to no easy answer. Some scholars see digital workers 
as a new class in the making, with solidarity and empowered subjectivity 
(Smith and Pun 2018), while others connect Chinese workers’ experience to 
the global trend of precarity and argue for a careful assessment of workers’ 
empowerment against political and institutional changes (Lee 2016). This 
literature provides critical and valuable understandings about labour agency 
and worker empowerment actions in general. In the debate on Chinese 
worker’s empowerment or class formation, however, there is limited 
systemic documentation and examination of workers’ exercise of agency. 
Complementing the macro approach toward the collective movement or 
institutional changes, we adopt a micro lens in this article to address the 
question of agency by examining workers’ lived experiences, struggles, and 
survival tactics in the shadow of platform capitalism. 
There has been a rapid expansion of the labour force in the Chinese 
digital economy during the last decade, and the trend is likely to continue. 
It is estimated that more than 200 million people will be working in China’s 
digital economy by 2020.1 Platform-mediated food-delivery service provision 
has become one of the fastest growing sectors for various employment types 
(Sun 2019). Although there is no official employment data about the food-
delivery sector, the number of riders at Meituan and Ele.me, the two market 
leaders in China, exceeded 6 million in May 2020.2 The emerging platform-
mediated logistical chain in the case of food-delivery service gives rise to 
intricate and networked relations among the platforms, intermediaries, 
restaurants, and workers, which to a large extent introduce new factors to 
shape workers’ subjectivities, identities, and the way in which they exercise 
and perform their agency.
In line with growing efforts to examine workers’ resistance and collective 
actions in the platform economy (Chen 2018; Cant 2019), we intend to 
explore food-delivery workers’ agentic performance. We not only document 
the localised and organised forms of workers’ resistance and activism, but 
also reflect on the reconfiguration of labour agency and workers’ subjectivity 
against the changing landscape of platform labour politics in China. We 
ask three questions: 1) How do food-delivery workers practice agency in 
their work? 2) How can their practice inform the current understandings of 
worker agency under platform capitalism? 3) What are the implications of 
this study for labour politics in contemporary China?
Addressing these questions, this article examines workers’ agency in the 
multi-layered labour regimes that are characterised by hypercapitalism 
(Graham 2000), algorithmic control of the labour process, and an eroding 
social foundation for solidarity and community-building among workers. 
We suggest a concept of “contingent agency” to capture Chinese gig 
workers’ expedient and dynamic mobilisation of individual and social 
resources and technologies to survive and thrive in the platform economy. 
The term contingent agency describes how food-delivery workers carve 
spaces for economic gains at the individual and small-scale collective levels 
while combating an increasingly unbalanced power that tilts toward the 
platform companies. As with all other social and cultural subjects, worker’s 
exercise of agency is self-evident (Ortner 2006), yet under-explored in, and 
outnumbered by, the mounting studies on the technological power of the 
platforms (e.g. Van Dijck et al . 2018). Far from a static possession, agency 
is almost always contingent on a number of structural and circumstantial 
1. “Digital Economy Opens up Employments Space for 200 million People,” Xinhuanet, 12 March 
2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/tech/2019-03/12/c_1124222712.htm (accessed on 26 May 
2020). 
2. “Factories trapped in hard recruitment, while the number of delivery riders is growing,” Tencent.
com, 5 May 2020, https://new.qq.com/omn/20200505/20200505A0F1O900.html (accessed on 
26 May 2020).
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factors. Nonetheless, by drawing attention to workers’ agency demonstrated 
through its tensions with a number of factors ranging from capitalistic logic 
and the algorithmic control of the labour process to the cultural tradition to 
establish mutually reciprocal social relations, we argue that the formation 
of contingent agency of platform workers in China is indicative of the new 
challenges and possibilities for the working subjects in platform capitalism.  
Literature review 
Situating agency in the digital workplace
Agency is an underpinning theme and analytical perspective in many 
philosophical and social theories (e.g. Giddens 1991). Scholars have 
examined different meanings and dimensions of agency, human agentic 
practices, and the relations between agency and social structures (Emirbayer 
and Mische 1998; Giddens 1991; Taylor 1985). According to Emirbayer 
and Mische (1998), agency is “a temporally embedded process of social 
engagement” (ibid.: 962), which is closely related to people’s construction of 
selfhood, will, freedom, creativity, and subjectivity. 
In labour studies, agency serves as a prominent perspective to investigate 
workers’ self-consciousness and collective capability of organisation to 
negotiate with employers or advance their rights in the face of state power 
and global capitalism. Although agency remains a key concept in labour 
studies, little literature has directly used the term “agency.” Instead, it is 
often replaced with concepts such as “collectivism” (Lucio and Stewart 
1997), “empowerment” (Vidal 2007), “resistance” (Bieler and Lee 2018), and 
“activism” (Zajak et al . 2017). As it is argued, agency is a significant mediator 
between social structure and social action (Emirbayer and Mische 1998). On 
the one hand, social structures such as class, habit, rules, systems, and other 
contextual elements may exert effects on people’s agentic consciousness. 
On the other hand, this agency shapes people’s social actions in different 
ways. Ortner (2006: 107) cautions against the deterministic tendency of 
the structuralists and suggests that subjectivity embodies the dialectic 
relationship between “the ensemble of modes of” perception, affect, and 
thought of a subject and “the cultural and social formations that shape, 
organize, and provoke those modes of affect [and] thought” of the acting 
subjects.
The booming digital economy and the widespread use of the Internet 
and mobile phones have inspired growing scholarly interest in how workers 
use digital technologies and how they respond to the digitally-mediated 
work environment. For example, Qiu (2016) depicts how the working class 
uses social media to create “worker-generated contents (WGCs)” in order 
to “inform, mobilize and counter-attack” in the labour struggles (ibid.: 627). 
Specifically related to the platform economy, Chen (2018) examines how 
taxi drivers in China fight against the ride-hailing platform through protests 
and algorithmic activism. Zhang documents how small business owners 
utilised social media to mobilise against the e-commerce platform Taobao’s 
“bloodsucking” (Zhang 2020: 128) exploitation. On the other hand, scholars 
also point to a further fragmentation and informalisation of the labour force 
in the digital economy, resulting in sustained erosion of workers’ structural 
power (Dyer-Witheford 2015; Lazar and Sanchez 2019). Fieseler, Bucher, 
and Hoffmann (2017: 27) argue that “work-based identity, cohesion and 
pride” is weakened significantly in crowdsourcing platforms such as Amazon 
Mechanical Turk, which undermines workers’ collective bargaining power.
It is tempting to explain the contradictory findings about workers’ 
resistance and activism in the digital economy as an “either/or” situation. 
Workers are either dominated or liberated by the technology. Instead 
of adopting the binary framework of “domination/resistance,” we draw 
inspiration from Ortner (2006: 110) and find that workers are what she calls 
“existentially complex” subjects who know and “make and seek meanings” 
of their situation, simultaneously acting on and being shaped by social and 
cultural forces. 
Using workers’ subjectivity as the implicit nexus to comprehend the 
agentic practices of workers and their relations to the shaping factors in 
the platform economy, we aim to show how the specific economic, social, 
and technological dimensions of platform work intersect with workers’ 
agentic performance and their meaning-making practices. The ever-changing 
chameleon platform has generated variant forms of employment relations 
and management practices that substantially affect workers’ subjectivity 
(Vallas and Schor 2020) and propel workers to exercise their agency against 
the platform company’s flexible application of “a portfolio” of management 
techniques at its disposal (Moore and Joyce 2019). It therefore entails a 
dynamic model to comprehend workers’ agency, which we call contingent 
agency. It considers workers’ agency to be locally and contextually specific 
manifestations inseparable from the networked structure and their social 
and employment relations that characterise platform work in the Chinese 
food-delivery service sector. Contingent agency is a heuristic device we 
develop to show how platform workers make meanings of their labour 
and defend and negotiate their labour rights against the shifting ground 
that is conditioned and mediated by the precarious structure of the digital 
platforms, heterogeneous forms of employment, technological surveillance, 
and the customer-oriented ideology. 
Platformisation of food-delivery service in China 
In less than ten years, food-delivery platforms have changed the eating 
habits of millions of Chinese and reconfigured the relation between 
consumption and service.3 By June 2019, more than 400 million people 
ordered food through the Internet, generating more than 600 billion RMB in 
transactions in one year (approx. 84 billion USD).4 The platform-mediated 
take-away service in China started in 2011, and after several rounds of 
mergers and acquisitions, the current market is dominated by a duopoly 
of Meituan and Ele.me – they control more than 90% of the market share. 
Collectively, the platforms set in motion a logistical supply chain thanks 
to the prevalence of smartphones. Nowadays the take-away economy has 
established a multi-layered supply chain involving different market players 
(Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Networked Relation between Delivery Workers and Platform 
Structures
3. In this article, food-delivery platform and take-away platform are used interchangeably.
4. “Statistical Reports on the Internet Development in China,” China Internet Network Information 
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In this logistical supply chain, platform companies have played 
important roles in connecting delivery workers, intermediaries, restaurants, 
and customers. The food-delivery platform mediates the online-to-offline 
transactions that bridge customers to food merchants through the labour 
pool of delivery workers. On the one hand, the platform tries to attract 
large numbers of consumers by providing them with on-demand food-
delivery service. On the other hand, it collaborates with restaurants, 
canteens, and food merchants to expand the latter’s customer base by 
charging the latter a rate of commission. The platform commissions may 
cost a partnering restaurant 15% to 35% of total revenue, depending on 
the business size, the daily volume of delivery orders, and the number of 
platforms the restaurant signs on. 
Driven by fierce market competition, the platform companies have 
launched several rounds of employment relations restructuring. Market 
leaders such as Ele.me, Meituan, Shansong, and Dianwoda have all 
outsourced their labour management work to third-party or intermediary 
temp staffing agencies (TSA) to cultivate their delivery labour pool. The 
boost of take-away platforms makes courier a popular job category for 
migrant workers. During the last decade, migrant workers have shifted 
from the construction and manufacturing industries to the platform-
mediated service sectors such as transportation, parcel courier, and food-
delivery.5 As previously mentioned, the number of riders on the food-
delivery platform has exceeded 6 million. The unregulated expansion of 
take-away platforms and their variant collaborations with intermediaries 
have generated different forms of delivery workers – namely, platform-
hired workers, outsourced workers, crowdsourced workers, and restaurant-
employed workers. Each type of rider differs in employment relation, 
management structure, and labour conditions.
Different forms of riders are mobilised by the platform companies to 
meet the ever-changing needs of the market. Platform-hired workers 
are couriers who are hired by the platform company and have signed a 
labour contract with the platform. Outsourced workers are couriers who 
are hired by third-party temp staffing agencies. They usually don’t have 
labour contracts but hold a labour agreement with the TSA. Crowdsourced 
workers are “independent workers” who usually work part time and don’t 
have labour contracts. As the market has been gradually dominated by 
Ele.me and Meituan, the number of platform-hired riders has decreased 
and the outsourced riders and crowdsourced riders have become the main 
labour force.
As the core of the supply chain for the food-delivery service, riders 
connect, mediate, and configure their relations between platforms, TSA, 
restaurants, and customers. They have built subtle and complex relations 
with various social structures and organisations and displayed diverse 
forms of agentic performances. The process of platformisation provides us 
with a way to consider workers’ agency to be an evolving and developing 
manifestation of workers’ subjectivity in their encounters with different 
players in the industry and the social structure.
Method
In order to investigate delivery workers’ agentic performances within 
the platform structures, this study employed ethnographic fieldwork 
and in-depth interviews as the main methods to collect data. Research 
participants are from Meituan, Ele.me, and Shansong, which were the 
dominant take-away platforms in China. From 2017 until late 2019, the 
research team frequented the stations (zhandian 站點) of the riders in 
the different districts of Beijing. After building rapport with them, the 
authors conducted participant observations and more than 40 semi-
structured interviews during the three-year period. In April and May 2020, 
the authors conducted an additional 10 interviews online to examine 
how delivery workers do their job and perform workers’ agency during 
the COVID-19 pandemic. The 10 interviewees were recruited via the 
snowballing technique from the authors’ existing connections in the 
riders’ community. Table 1 shows the demographic breakdown of the 
courier interviewees. 
Table 1: Interviewee demographics
Age
18 to 25 9





The total of 50 interviews each lasted from 30 to 120 minutes. 
Interview questions revolve around their work history, work conditions, 
employment relations, and experience with the platform-mediated work 
environment. Delivery workers were also encouraged to share stories 
and opinions on how they manage their work and interact with the 
platform(s). In the latest round of interviews, we added new questions 
about the impact of the novel coronavirus on their work. The authors also 
joined a WeChat group of 500 riders to observe how they communicate, 
what content was posted, and how they create solidarity and subjectivity 
through daily communicative practices. 
All interviews were anonymised and transcribed, and then coded by the 
authors together with all observational notes. Informed by the grounded 
theory perspective (Corbin and Strauss 2014), we generated insights 
about worker’s agency from the qualitative data by constantly situating 
the riders through their lens and in their social context. Consequently, 
the analysis is driven and centred on worker’s narratives. In order not 
to impose existing theoretical frameworks on the riders, we converse 
with existing studies and theories when the workers’ experience echoes, 
complicates, or contradicts them. 
Contingent agency in the food-delivery platforms
Platform-based affordance and constraints
As far as the platform-mediated labour process is concerned, Moore 
and Joyce (2019) warn against an uncritical fixation on the algorithms, 
which risks overlooking the “two-way” relationship in employment. 
Workers resist, as they contend, whenever they find where the “pressure 
points are and levels and effectiveness of resistance increase” (Moore 
and Joyce 2019: 8). The volatility of the platform-mediated market 
for the food-delivery service gives rise to multiple places of those 
“pressure points.” Among them are the interstices riders discover in the 
competitions between different platform companies. During the past 
decade, the market for platform-mediated food-delivery service in China 
5. “Gig economy is the reservoir of labour after COVID-19,” LinkedIn Netease, 2020, http://mp.163.
com/article/FE5RDH630514D39S.html (accessed 3 June 2020).
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has evolved into a duopoly with multiple small players. To compete 
against one another, different platform companies have launched 
several rounds of labour recruitment by raising financial incentives and 
providing various forms of part-time jobs, which present more ongoing 
job opportunities for riders. For savvy delivery workers, every round of 
competition between platforms means a chance to make a choice in their 
job, or even lifestyle. 
It’s hard for people like me to find another full-time job. This job is 
an easy choice because I can decide when and where to go (…). I 
do this because I don’t want to be monitored [like those working] 
in the factories. When I have time, I log on and take some orders; 
if I don’t want to work today, I can stay in my bed all day. (Daxing 
District, Beijing, 13 July 2019)
Xu has been working as a part-time rider intermittently in Ele.me for 
three years. He believed that the platform economy provided him with 
more autonomy regarding schedules and locations. He was good at 
catching the ebbs and flows of the market demand. Usually he took peak-
hour delivery requests during the day, or those in extreme weather or 
when there are transportation controls and other emergent conditions, 
as the piece rate tends to surge under those circumstances. He managed 
to join several WeChat groups of riders, where people share information 
about the locations and times of “big [well-paid] orders” (dadan 大單). 
The informational function of social media (Qiu 2016) helped extend Xu’s 
social networks, which in turn made it convenient for Xu to straddle two 
jobs. 
Another case came from Wang, a 王牌騎士 (wangpai qishi , a top level 
rider known as “trump rider”) in the Shansong platform, which provides 
intra-city courier service. Starting from 2016, Wang has been working as a 
courier for four years. 
[The job] works for me. It’s quite flexible. If I want to work, I log 
onto the system. If not, I close it and do my own things. But people 
are greedy... For example, at the very beginning, I was very happy 
with earning 100 RMB from the platform. But soon, I wanted to 
make more [money]. I wanted 200 RMB… Now, I can make 400 
to 500 RMB [a day], and I am still not satisfied. (Chaoyang District, 
Beijing, 10 June 2018)
Unlike Xu, who took delivery jobs intermittently, Wang developed 
the job into a full-time one, although he joined Shansong as a part-
time courier. When talking about his work in Shansong, Wang felt 
motivated, and believed his efforts had been rewarded by the platform. 
In his narratives, flexibility not only brings him extra income, but also the 
freedom to choose what he wants to do. Wang worked more than 10 
hours every day at Shansong so he could maintain the “trump rider” level 
and have a higher piece rate. 
As the expanding platform capitalism reconfigures the pattern of 
employment relations, it also affords certain opportunities and choices 
for workers, although such affordance appears to be fleeting and 
unpredictable. Unlike the early generation of workers who emphasise 
stability and security (e.g. Kuruvilla et al . 2011), the young generation 
of digital workers such as Xu places more value on flexibility and self-
decision than a guaranteed nine-to-five job. Our study found that extra 
income and self-decision are among the most appealing reasons for 
migrant workers who do not have an “iron rice bowl” (tiefanwan, 鐵飯碗, 
guaranteed lifetime employment) to flock to the food-delivery platforms. 
Some workers also consider the delivery job to be a good transitional 
choice that offers them the income and time to think about what to do 
in the future. The lack of entrenched attachment to any platform position 
generates a pool of workers who have developed a different mental 
orientation toward their job. The prevailing ethos of the platform workers 
has shifted toward placing value in the “slashie” style (Alboher 2007), 
self-entrepreneur (Freeman 2015), and individual’s economic gains, which 
are shown in their agentic performance. 
However, compared with sectors such as manufacturing and 
construction, platform-based employment is rife with volatility, 
uncertainty, and a lack of workplace-based social interaction among 
peers, as the job is undertaken through mobile apps without the 
physical presence of co-workers. Most of the time, workers have to 
adapt themselves into a work situation that lacks mutual collaboration 
and guidance. Workers have to play guerrilla warfare with the platform 
as they do not know when and where they may lose the job or need 
to find another one. In this sense, workers’ agency is contingent 
not only upon the assorted forms of precarious and transitory job 
opportunities on offer in platform capitalism at its current stage, but 
also upon workers’ certain degree of identification with the flexibility 
and risk embedded in platform work. Workers embracing the risks 
and uncertainties associated with platform work cannot be fully 
explained by the concepts of self-exploitation or false consciousness. 
This is where workers’ subjectivity comes into play, wherein agency is 
articulated through meanings and earnings made by workers as well as 
through the “affect” (Ortner 2016) workers generate from their own 
choice of being a platform labourer.
Workaround strategies to wrestle with capitalistic logic  
Numerous studies suggest that workers are not only “knowing 
subjects” (Ortner 2016), but are also able to develop an array of 
tactics to game the platform system and resist the platform-facilitated 
labour management (see, e.g. Chen 2018; Moore and Joyce 2019). The 
“workaround strategies” (Lee et al . 2015) developed by riders in our study 
can best be described as improvised efforts to follow and seize on the 
high rate . In practice, these efforts include riders’ behaviour to frequently 
change to the platform that pays a higher piece rate, or to work on 
multiple platforms, or a combination of the two. To follow and seize on 
the high rate even primes some riders to devise individual or collaborative 
actions, such as installing cheating software, to manipulate the system. 
Zhang was a courier in “Starbucks Delivers” of Ele.me, and during 
the last three years, he had changed his job five times among different 
delivery platforms. When asked why he had to change the platforms he 
worked for so frequently, Zhang stressed the relevance of income: “The 
grass is always greener… When the pay is getting low, everyone goes to 
the platforms that can earn them more money.” To organise riders into a 
hierarchy with a pay scale is common to Chinese food-delivery platforms, 
most of which also deploy varied degree of gamification (Sun 2019). 
Confronting this calculated labour management, workers chose to tilt 
towards money instead of stability.
Zhang’s rationality was echoed by his co-worker and fellow villager 
Cai. When at Baidu Deliveries, Cai was once a station manager whose job 
was to stay in the station office and monitor the real-time performance 
of each rider. Baidu Deliveries paid stable wages and bonuses to station 
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managers and prohibited them from providing delivery service. But Cai 
discovered Baidu’s crowdsourcing platform (then a new app) offering “a 
very high piece rate,” which could rise to 5 or 6 RMB for noon peak time 
deliveries. So Cai and a station manager nearby organised several “riders 
in their respective stations” to deliver orders from the crowdsourcing 
platform. Unfortunately, they were caught by the company and penalised 
with public warnings and a fine of 500 RMB for Cai. In retrospect, Cai 
attributed the discovery of his policy violation to the use of his national 
ID to register on the crowdsourcing platform. “I could have used other 
people’s ID,” he concluded, “as other people did.”
But the penalty did not deter Cai from seizing on the high piece rate 
available on the market. After that, Cai quit his job and joined a group of 
more than 300 couriers to complete what was known as “the assigned 
orders” (zhipai dan 指派單). The assigned orders were “very lucrative” in 
Cai’s eyes, with an additional pay of 5 RMB for each order within 5 km 
and of 10 RMB each for orders between 5 and 10 km. Cai stayed until the 
group was disbanded when Baidu’s food-delivery business merged into 
the Ele.me platform.
From work, riders also accumulated certain knowledge about the 
algorithmic control of their labour process and developed tactical 
practices to manipulate the algorithms for their own interests. In 2017, 
when a bonus war took place between Ele.me and Meituan, food-delivery 
workers colluded with some canteens and restaurants to place artificial 
orders, for which riders waited nearby to ensure they would be allocated 
for the delivery. Riders then pretended to have completed the delivery by 
simply clicking the completion button on the app. Once the fake orders 
were finished, riders and the participant canteens and restaurants would 
share the cash bonus awarded by the platforms. Some workers went so 
far as to install bots to bypass certain platform-imposed restrictions (e.g. 
location or single platform) or to help them automatically get better paid 
jobs. All these questionable individual or collaborative manipulations of 
platform algorithms are known as shuadan (刷單, meaning “to refresh for 
better orders”), which is fraudulent and punishable by the platform. 
These openings in the forms of economic gains profoundly shift 
workers’ attitude and motivations for job changes in two respects. First, 
information about piece rates and the differences of even a couple of 
Chinese yuan between platforms or types of riders is made more visible to 
workers than in other sectors, and it is designed as such by the platforms 
to directly incentivise workers at a more granular level. Consequently, 
although social ties remain important for riders (e.g., in Cai’s experience), 
riders demonstrate and exert a certain level of agency to mitigate against 
their precarious socio-economic status by taking advantage of the 
information and their knowledge about the workings of the algorithms. 
This points to the increasing significance of market information, as 
opposed to the “trial and error” method (Tian and Xu 2015), in platform 
workers’ decisions to change jobs. Secondly, studies show that migrant 
workers change their jobs to accumulate human and social capital (e.g., 
knowledge and skills) so that after several job changes, some workers are 
able to climb the occupational ladder or land a better paid job (Wang and 
Wu 2010; Tian and Xu 2015). It would be premature to determine the 
accumulation of human and social capital in riders’ job change patterns, 
but economic benefit seems to become the sole motivation for their job 
mobility, while the foundation for knowledge and skills accumulation is 
undermined in platform capitalism.
Although workers’ counter-algorithm actions are common and 
ongoing, it must be noted that they are not only risky, encountering 
frequent failures and platform crackdowns, but also contingent on the 
specific technological affordance of the platforms. Usually, no sooner do 
workers develop a tactic to game the system than the platform upgrades 
its app, fixing the bugs or intensifying surveillance on workers. Workers’ 
gained knowledge and skills are quickly made obsolete by the platforms, 
which weakens their transferability to the next job. Platforms’ technology 
hegemony, embodied in the continuous upgrades and enhanced 
algorithmic control through workers’ mobile phones, circumscribes 
worker’s agentic performance. To a certain degree, workers’ order-farming 
and algorithmic manipulation activities would inadvertently help the 
platform companies detect technological bugs, for one, and to generate 
data to strengthen the platform competitiveness on the market, which 
ultimately reproduces the capitalistic logic and the power structure 
(Fleming and Spicer 2003).
Social relations: Cultivating renqing
As the take-away platform is an immediate supply chain, its efficient 
operation requires each part to function well. However, timely delivery 
depends not only on the riders but also on restaurants. Riders often 
complain about the slowness and inefficiency of restaurants in food 
preparation, which may cause an overtime on their delivery. Since On 
Time Delivery (OTD) is a key performance indicator for the platform 
and the intermediaries to evaluate delivery teams, both the riders and 
the team leaders (or station managers) take on-time delivery seriously. 
For example, Ele.me requires every delivery worker to complete orders 
of less than three kilometres in 29 minutes. If the overtime rate of one 
team exceeds 5%, both the workers and team leader face a bonus cut 
from their income. Consequently, riders and managers develop certain 
tactics to maintain a good relationship with the restaurants, which 
straddles between business ties and the brotherly social relations that 
are best understood through the cultural lens of guanxi  (關係 meaning 
social relations) and renqing (人情 meaning reciprocal social and moral 
obligations). In Fei’s (1992) conceptualisation, guanxi  connotes both 
social networks and relations “from the soil” and the moral and ethical 
principle of mutual reciprocity (renqing) to discipline the interpersonal 
relationship. For the latter, guanxi  and renqing can be instrumental and 
subject to conscious cultivation or even manipulation (Barbalet 2015).
Wu was a Shansong leader in Chaoyang District, Beijing, who was 
in charge of 20 groups of 200 delivery workers. Wu reached out to 60 
restaurants in the covered business areas to foster the social relations 
with them. He visited the restaurants one by one, introducing himself to 
the restaurant managers and staff. Wu and his colleagues also frequented 
these places and drank with staff who were responsible for the take-
away business. According to Wu, to “get a top place in the competition 
against other delivery teams” motivated him to engage in the socialising 
activities: 
As long as the restaurant prepares the food fast enough, my bros 
[riders] can deliver them on time. Otherwise, it threatens the on-
time delivery of the entire team and hinders bros in my team from 
getting [the rewards] they deserve… [When there is a conflict in 
cooking at the restaurants], I would call them. Usually they give me 
mianzi  (literally mean “face” in Chinese) and finish our orders first.
(Online interview in Beijing, 1 May 2020)
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Wu figured that one restaurant may sign up on several take-away 
platforms, and its treatment of delivery orders from different platforms 
matters. During the peak time, Wu’s amicable relationship with the 
restaurants pays off as they may prioritise orders for his Shansong team 
and thus help decrease the chance of delayed deliveries. Wu’s team has 
been among the top three best performing Shansong delivery teams in 
Beijing for the last three years, which can be attributed to Wu’s deliberate 
cultivation of an amicable relationship with the restaurants. 
Furthermore, workers in Wu’s team also mentioned the importance 
of maintaining good relations with individual staff in the restaurants. 
For example, Li said, “[it is] important to know the take-away kitchen 
assistant. S/he decides our sequence to collect the food. If s/he 
knows you, you would get the food before others (workers from other 
platforms).” Another worker, Song, kept brotherly relations with cooks in 
several restaurants. “When I cannot wait any longer, I go directly to the 
back kitchen to urge them.” He believed this offered him a head start to 
receive food during rush times. 
Embedded in an interrelated supply chain, riders exercise individual 
agency in a networked yet individualised fashion for which personal 
“guanxi” and relations “from the soil” (Fei 1992) gain valence. The 
currency of Wu’s mianzi  is acquired through socialising activities with 
restaurant owners and managers. Workers such as Li and Song become 
personally acquainted with their counterparts at the restaurant. In a 
similar manner, both actions help shorten the social distance between 
riders and the restaurants, attaching human feelings and moral obligations 
(renqing 人情) to the otherwise impersonalised business transaction from 
food preparation (by the restaurant) to collection (by the rider).
Social relations and community support prove to be significant 
indicators of workers’ agency (Chan 2013), whereas for delivery 
workers the platform work-based social relation network is structurally 
distributed, fragile, and easy to dissolve. Although food-delivery couriers 
can foster work relations by cultivating instrumental personal ties and 
collaborative opportunities, these relations and renqing are contingent, 
transient, and subject to change at any time. Throughout our fieldwork, 
we found that relatively long-term and stable social relations among 
workers, canteens, and group managers are hard to maintain due to 
workers’ high mobility and the constant structural changes of the 
platform assemblage. For example, Wu’s team has a high turnover rate. 
Wu spent a large amount of time recruiting couriers and frequenting 
restaurants whose managers also change from time to time. Even the 
brotherly relations change within the platform. Li complained that the 
platform changed too quickly as the kitchen assistant he knew before 
was transferred to another branch. 
Unlike manufacturing workers, for whom the shared workplace and 
fixed work schedule are conducive to solidarity building, platform workers 
have been mobilised in a distributed and individualised environment 
where physical presence and offline gathering are removed from their 
labour process. Thanks to the penetration of the Internet and mobile apps, 
platform work becomes “easy-come easy-go” work that allows the labour 
force to flow and move at a speed never seen before. Workers’ frequent 
job-hopping and platforms’ transient operating policies undermine the 
structural social and cultural foundations for workers to establish reliable 
and long-term social connections. This systematically circumscribes the 
channels through which platform workers mobilise social capital and 
cultural bonding to practice their agency. 
Counteractions 
Although counteractions are one of the most viable manifestations of 
workers’ agency, they are under-studied among delivery workers. China 
Labour Bulletin  (CLB) has identified food-delivery and parcel couriers 
among the most contentious workers in the Internet-related economy.6 
Our fieldwork documented how riders mobilise technological and social 
resources to empower themselves in the face of unbalanced power 
relations with their employers and the platform companies. Overall, riders 
tend to participate in protests or disputes caused by unfair treatment and 
pay-cut related issues.
Wang, mentioned above, was a trump rider. In general, Shansong 
couriers are grouped into three ranks that correspond to different ways of 
getting orders and different levels of priority when it comes to automatic 
job-allocation. Newcomers, with a typical service score of 60, rely on 
themselves to claim delivery orders (known as order-grabbing, or in 
Chinese qiangdan 搶單). When newcomers have fulfilled a satisfactory 
number of completed deliveries and reached a service score of 85 or 
more, they can apply to become a rider on the dispatch mode (known as 
order-dispatching, or in Chinese paidan 派單). The highest level of rider on 
the dispatch mode is called the trump rider, which can only be applied to 
riders who are already at the dispatch level and have maintained a high 
service score. Trump riders enjoy the top priority in job-allocation. Both 
trump and dispatching riders can switch to the mode of order-grabbing 
and enjoy a higher priority than lower-ranked riders at the order-grabbing 
level. 
In October 2019, Shansong started to subcontract to third-party 
staffing agencies for recruiting and managing full-time couriers. The 
subcontracted agencies introduced new couriers to the business and 
placed them directly at the level of order-dispatching. Wang and other 
experienced riders found that the platform was treating them unfairly:
It is unfair because we have been working our way through order-
grabbing, application for the dispatch mode and so on. We stayed 
and followed this rule for a couple of years, [especially] during the 
period of time when the platform company was not doing well. 
Now that the company is getting better, this is inappropriate. (Online 
interview in Beijing, 3 May 2020)
After sharing their grievance in several WeChat groups and online 
forums, Wang’s co-workers organised about 300 experienced riders to 
stage a protest against unfair treatment at the Shansong headquarters 
in Beijing’s Haidian District. The local police intervened. After the senior 
managers of Shansong met with rider representatives, the company 
decided to place all of the subcontracted full-time couriers at the level 
of new-comer. This means they would start from grabbing the orders and 
work their way up. 
Shansong riders’ experience of the platform’s arbitrary decision to 
allow third-party staffing agencies to take over labour recruitment and 
6. “The state of labour relations in China, 2019,” China Labour Bulletin, 13 January 2020, https://clb.
org.hk/content/state-labour-relations-china-2019 (accessed on 8 February 2021).
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management is hardly unique. As early as in August 2017, a group of 
Baidu Deliveries riders successfully organised to defend their labour rights. 
On 24 August 2017, Baidu announced the merger of its food-delivery 
platform with Ele.me. Accompanying the merger was an arbitrary bulk 
transfer of former Baidu-hired riders to third-party temp staffing agencies. 
This meant that those Baidu riders would become subcontracted Ele.me 
riders, which violated the labour rights of the former Baidu riders. Cai was 
a station manager when the transfer took place. He recollected a labour 
dispute initiated by Baidu riders in Beijing’s Chaoyang District. 
After consulting a lawyer who took the case pro bono, five or six riders 
took the case to the labour dispute arbitration committee in Chaoyang 
District in September 2017… It took about half a year… But the riders 
successfully obtained compensation. (Online interview in Beijing, 1 
May 2020)
When COVID-19 broke out in China before the Chinese New Year, 
most of the couriers in Beijing had left their jobs and returned to their 
hometowns. When the city was in a lockdown, food delivery orders surged 
with fewer workers on duty, which inevitably intensified the workload 
for the remaining riders in Beijing. However, these workers didn’t get 
overtime payments. In the last week of January, 2020, couriers of Meituan 
in Beijing worked more than 15 hours per day, and most of them were 
exhausted and overwhelmed. Riders at one zhandian in Haidian district 
organised a work stoppage, demanding that the intermediary and the 
platform compensate their overtime. Given the mounting pressure and 
the special circumstances of the pandemic, the platform company and 
intermediaries agreed to give each worker overtime pay during the New 
Year holiday. However, after the holiday, as the pandemic gradually came 
under control, despite a continued surge of orders and a labour shortage, 
the platform and intermediaries refused to pay workers overtime, and the 
confrontation between workers and the platform persisted. 
With the expansion of TSA into the platform-mediated food-delivery 
service sector, the unfair treatment of subcontracted riders is rampant, 
while full-time platform-hired riders are in decline. Wage arrears and 
arbitrary pay cuts by either the platforms or the staffing agencies 
have become the main reason for food-delivery riders to take legal or 
collective action in the absence of official trade unions. A glimpse into 
the national picture of food-delivery riders’ collective actions from June 
2019 to June 2020 revealed that 16 out of 17 protests and strikes were 
caused by either wage arrears or pay cuts. Although our fieldwork found 
that almost half of our informants either have participated in collective 
actions themselves or were aware of collective actions taken by others, 
workers’ collective actions lead to mixed results. The lack of systematic 
social support and the highly volatile and individualised work conditions 
contribute to workers’ contemporary agentic performance. 
Conclusion
The article offers a rich and nuanced account of the contextual and 
at times contradictory means by which food-delivery workers exercise 
their individual and collective agency for self-empowerment. This account 
makes a meaningful and timely contribution to the fields of platform 
labour studies and worker agency studies by bringing the worker narrative 
to the fore. It finds that along with the unpredictable expansion of the 
platform economy, platform workers have gained some measure of 
control and self-decision regarding when, where, and how to participate 
in platform work. More importantly, our findings contradict the popular 
myth of impenetrable black-boxed management of workers (see Moore 
and Joyce 2019), as riders have displayed sufficient knowledge about how 
the platform works and what managerial techniques are deployed against 
them. Platform workers have also developed workaround strategies, 
mobilised personal relations and social resources, and participated in 
social activism and counteraction against platform capitalism. 
However, the wide range of agentic performances of delivery workers 
entails a careful conceptualisation of workers’ agency in the context 
of the platform-mediated work environment. Platform-mediated work 
is characterised by a highly fluid and heterogeneous workforce, fierce 
market competitions, arbitrary algorithmic control, and unpredictable 
management practices (van Dijck et al . 2018; Sun 2019; Chen and 
Sun 2020). As food-delivery workers are mostly migrant workers, their 
informal employment status substantially undermines their collective 
bargaining power (Fan 2021), which cannot be offset by the wide array of 
agentic performances demonstrated in their lived working experiences. In 
particular, the high fluidity of food-delivery riders is in line with an extant 
trend of shortening job tenure among the young generation of Chinese 
migrant workers (Tsinghua Sociology Research Team 2013), which results 
in a minimum level of skill development and upward social mobility. The 
absence of institutional empowerment for migrant workers in general 
exacerbates the precarity of food-delivery workers in the platform 
economy. 
Consequently, their agentic performances are largely circumstantial and 
reactive to the precarious and unpredictable platform assemblage. But this 
by no means suggests that workers are all but act to extend the capital’s 
logic. Nor is our intention to advocate a “false optimism” (Lee 2016: 
328) that workers’ agentic performance would lead to either political 
or institutional empowerment, which is difficult to achieve without the 
political will of party leaders. On the contrary, we conceptualise the 
notion of “contingent agency” and flesh out multiple contingent factors 
so as to capture both the structurally vulnerable position of the food-
delivery workers and the multifold, ongoing, and proactive tactics and 
strategies developed and manoeuvred by workers. Contingent agency lays 
bare the unstable situation where platform workers have to constantly 
calculate their current and prospective income, act on foreseeable 
opportunities to increase or maximise earnings, engage in expansion of 
personal and social ties, participate in negotiation of wages and labour 
rights, and if needed, mobilise themselves for collective actions. 
Wood and Lehdonvirta (2019: 1) argue that there is a “structure 
antagonism” between workers and the platforms that “manifests as 
perceived conflicts over platform fees, pay rates, and lack of worker voice.” 
“Structured antagonism” is one of the distinctive contributing factors 
to workers’ participation in collective actions even when they regard 
themselves as self-employed. Our findings complicate and compliment 
this argument, as workers’ agentic performances are external mechanisms 
that are developed to tackle the unpredictability of platformisation 
rather than endogenous self-awareness. We contend that the notion of 
contingent agency offers a new perspective to the eternal problem of 
control and resistance in labour studies. Platform workers are more like 
temporarily agentic subjects whose empowerment and selfhood are 
contingent on the highly unstable platform structures of which they are 
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